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EDITOBIAL NOTES
LEGAL LIMITATION ON MUNICIPAL BEAUTIICATION,*-What are
the legal limitations on municipal beautification? Particularly to.
what extent may a city, under its so-called police power,' legally
beautify its buildings, streets and open spaces by zoning ordinances
or otherwise? If a city's charter or a statute purports to authorize
such municipal beautification, may the city legally divide its terri-
tory into "residence districts," "business districts" and "unre-
stricted districts," and prohibit the building of business houses
in residence districts, or unsightly houses, or unsightly advertising
signs in any district? To illustrate, could a city prohibit the build-
ing of a public garage, Or a gasoline filling station, or an apartment.
house in its exclusively residential zone? Or may a city legally
establish aesthetic building lines and require all new buildings to
be erected in conformity with such aesthetic plan? Or may a city
legally limit the height of buildings, or legally require buildings
to be of a certain height, or of an approved type in order to carry
out some aesthetic purpose?
Of course to the extent that such regulations have the effect of
reasonably promoting the public health, morals, order or safety,
and, to some extent, the general convenience or general welfare,
there is, broadly speaking, no legal limitation on such incidental
municipal beautification.2 For example a city could legally require
all business houses, whose business was so noisome as to be injurious
to the health of nearby residents, to locate outside the residential
zone,3 thus incidentally enhancing the beauty of the city. Or a city
could legally require the use of smoke-destroying apparatus on fac-
tory chimneys to prevent the unreasonable emission of smoke,,
* Part of a paper read at the West Virginia Cities Conference on City Planning and
Zoning, Morgantown, March 19, 1924.
As to the use of the power of eminent domain for aesthetic purposes see
Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. n. 77 (1899), (limiting the
height of buildings for aesthetic purposes) ; Luwis, EMINENT DOMAIN, 3rd. ed., §271
(1909). Compare State ex rel. Sale v. Stahlman, 81 W. Va. 335, 337, 94 S. D.
497, 498 (1917), (a police-power case with a dictum as to the use of eminent
domain). Upon principle it would seem that an aesthetic use is such a public
use as, upon paying Just compensation, will justify a "taking of property" under
the power of eminent domain. See In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946,
252 S. W. 404 (Mo. 1923). But, since a "regulation of the use of property" under
the police power does not involve compensation for the injury, may a city under its
police power legally limit the use of Intra-city property to aesthetic uses? In
the very nature of things aesthetic city planning and zoning ordinarily involves
a "regulation of the use of property" rather than a "taking of property." Besides
the police power is admittedly the most practical instrumentality for municipal
beautification. Hence the present quacre is confined to the use of the police
power for aesthetic purposes.
2 No attempt has been made in these foot notes to cite all cases in point.
See. e. g., Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137 (1912) ; State ex rel Sale
v. Stahlman, supra note 1. Compare City of Martinsburg v. Miles, 121 S. E. 285
(W. Va. 1924), (City may prohibit projections over sidewalks whether they inter-
fere with public travel or not, thus incidentally promoting municipal aesthetics).
3 See, e. g., Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171 (1915), (requiring livery
stable to locate outside a certain rather densely populated district).
' City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., 199 N. Y. 207, 92 X. E. 641.
(1910).
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thus incidentally promoting municipal beautification, for such
smoke, in addition to impairing the beauty of the city, is injurious
to both health and property.
But unfortunately where the regulating purpose of such city
planning and zoning is purely aesthetic, the courts of last resort
in some states, including West Virginia, have unequivocally denied
the legality of regulations for municipal beautification. Thus,
in a case decided in 1915 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that a city could not under the police power establish
a building line and prohibit owners from building nearer to the
street than that line, as the regulating plan was purely aesthetic.'
In another case,e decided in 1917, the only other West Virginia
ease directly in point,7 (although there is a recent dictum to the
same effect) 8 the West Virginia court held that a city, under its
police power, could not prevent the owner of a lot situated between
comparatively high buildings from erecting thereon a one-story
building, as the purpose of the city's regulation was merely aesthe-
tic. Perhaps under the peculiar circumstances involved this latter
attempt at muncipal beautification went to an unreasonable length
and was therefore unjustifiable. But the court argued that an
aesthetic purpose, apparently because everybody doesn't appreciate
an aesthetic purpose, is not protected under the police power, and
therefore to limit the use of one's property to aesthetic uses would
be to deprive the owner of property without due process of law.
However, the latest West Virginia decision squarely so holding
is now seven years old.' And while the West Virginia decisions
undoubtedly deny the legality of such beautification, it does not
necessarily follow that in West Virginia today such aesthetic city
planning and zoning, if reasonable, is not legally permissible. For
the law of today is what the courts would decide today, not merely
what the courts have already decided.10 As America's greatest
living judge, Mr. Justice Holmes, has so well expressed it :11
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact and nothing
more pretentious are what I mean by the law."
Other courts, contra to prior decisions, have reached conclusions
Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. E. 105 (1915).
State ex rel. Sale v. Stahlman, supra note 1.
7 State ex rel. Nunley v. mayor and City Council of Montgomery, 117 S. E. 888
(W. Va. 1923), doer not directly raise the point, as the city had not taken the
proper steps to raise the point, viz., had not passed an ordinance; but the West
Virginia court by way of dictum adhered to what it had said in its prior decisions.
s See foot note 7.
o See foot note 7.
1o Hansen v. Grand Trunk Ry., 78 N. H. 518, 102 At. 625 (1917).
U Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAnv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
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-which in effect are contra to the West Virginia decisions.'12  And
as an eminent judge has recently said in a Connecticut case:'3
"That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules
of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fulness
of experience, serve another generation badly, and which dis-
cards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law repre-
sents what should be according to the established and settled rules
of society, and no considerable property rights have become
vested in reliance upon the old rule .... The common law ....
is not and it should not be stationary. Change of this character
should not be left to the legislature."
What, then, will the courts "do in fact" when the question is
again raised whether such aesthetic municipal planning and zon-
ing is legally permissible? Again Mr. Justice Holmes has admirably
indicated the correct answer. He says :14
"Every opinion [that is, every opinion of every member of the
community] tends to become a law."
In other words, if you have a sufficiently preponderant public
opinion in favor of a given proposition, that proposition, at any
rate in the generality of cases, will ultimately become law, embodied
in judicial decisions. For law, in the long run, is, or tends to be,
an expression of the preponderant settled opinion of society, an
expression of community ideals, the mores of the times,15 as under-
stood by the judges of the time being. As Dean Pound, perhaps
our greatest American jurist, has well said:16
"Cases . . . . must be decided in the long run so as to accord
with the moral sense of the community."
Many decisions, e. g., the West Virginia decisions, reason that
an aesthetic purpose is not protected under the police power. That
raises the question: What can a city do under its police power?
32 It is true that these courts generally, if not always, say that such aesthetic
regulations promote the public health, morals, order, safety or the general con-
venience or general welfare, rather than, or in addition to, the aesthetic. But in
law as elsewhere actions speak louder than words. And there is no doubt that
in fact the reasonable promotion of the aesthetic is a vital factor if not the vital
factor which these courts consciously, subconsciously or unconsciously employ to
sustain these regulations. See Chandler, "The Attitude of the Law Toward Beauty."
8 A. B. A. J. 470 (1922); Notes, 19 MImi. L. REV. 191 (1920), (several cases
collected).
13 Wheeler, J., in Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99, 92 AtI. 883 (1915).
14 Lochner V. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905).
See Young, The Law as an Expression of Community Ideals, and the Law
Making Function of Courts, 27 YALE L. J. 1 (1917); Corbin, The Law and the
Judges, 3 YALE REVIEW (N. S.) 234, 249 (1914) ; Ehrlich, "The Sociology of Law,"
36 HAnv. L. REV. 130 (1922) ; Duguit, 21 Co. L. REV. 17, 22, 24, 25, 28-34
(1921).
20 Pound, "Spurious Interpretation," 7 CoL. L. REV. 379,384 (1907).
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Again Mr. Justice Holmes has given us the classic answer. He
says 1 7
"The police power extends to all the great public needs
It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or
held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant
opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public
welfare. "
Therefore, if we now have or hereafter create a preponderant
settled opinion in favor of such aesthetic city planning and zon-
ing, the courts should not, and, I think, will not refuse to permit
such municipal beautification. In many states, perhaps including
West Virginia, there is a present-day tendency to depart from prior
decisions when the prior decisions are so out of harmony with
present-day conceptions of justice, so out of harmony with prepon-
derant settled public opinion that departure from prior decisions
will secure the greatest good of the greatest number-when, every-
thing considered, the good to be accomplished by departure, from
precedent outweighs the good to be secured by adherence to prece-
dent. 8  If therefore, there is not as yet a preponderant settled
opinion in a given state in favor of such aesthetic city planning and
zoning, a court, having once held that such municipal beautification.
is not legally permissible, would, in all probability, so hold today.
If that is so, it behooves us to create in our cities a preponderant
settled opinion in favor of municipal beautification. This can
be accomplished by municipal organizations and by newspaper
articles in favor of aestheitc city planning and zoning. If such pre-
ponderant opinion is created it is reasonably certain that courts
will sanction such municipal beautification.
Let me briefly attempt to prove that in the main, this, in effect.
is how the law has worked out, or is tending to work out, in
various states. Until recently it was universally held that, under
the police power at any rate, an owner of property could not be
lawfully restrained from using his property as he pleased when
the objection was that such use merely injured the aesthetic sensi-
bilities of the community.19 And the courts held so principally for
17 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111 (1911).
38 See CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 112, 113, and Lecture IV.
particularly at pp. 150, 151, 160, 161 (1921). See Falconer v. Simmons, si w. Va.
172, 179, 41 S. E. 193 (1902) ; Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922).
In the first part of its opinion in the latter case the court attempts to base its
opinion on the rigid common law rule, but, as the dissenting opinion of the president
of the court clearly points out, the majority opinion in fact departs from the common
law rule. And in the latter part of the majority opinion we find this significant
statement: "We think the practical administration of Justice between the parties
is more the duty of the court than the preservation of some esoteric theory [of]
law.'
2i City of Passiac v. Patterson Bill Posting etc. Co. 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 At. 267
(1905).
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the reason that until recently the aesthetic sensibilities of the ma-
jority of the community were not sufficiently acute to insist upon
legal protection. Thus a few years ago an eminent English jurist,
comparing the French and English in this respect, could appro-
priately quote :20
"Nature which gave them the gout
Only gave us the gout."
But with the advance of civilization, aesthetic sensibilities of com-
munities became more sensitive, demanding legal protecton. The
"taste" which nature gave the French we are gradually acquiring.
And today unsightly surroundings may in a given community
cause as much general and genuine human unhappiness as perturb-
ing sounds2 ' or noisome smells2 2 against which the law has long
since given legal protection under the police power. Therefore
the opinion of civilized communities is beginning to preponderate,
in some states at any rate, in favor of reasonably securing the
aesthetic sensibilities of the community against anti-aesthetic sur-
roundings. Hence, since, as Mr. Justice Holmes has said,23 "every
opinion tends to become a law," the recent tendency of the law is
to secure the community interest in aesthetic surroundings2 4 by
municipal laws designed, in part at least, to beautify municipal
communities, for example, by so-called zoning ordinances establish-
ing aesthetic building lines25 or districts for residences only.2 1
Thus in a rather recent decision, sustaining a zoning ordinance
which excluded brick factories from residential districts, the United
States Supreme Court said:2 7
"There must be progress and if in its march private interests
are in the way, they must yield to the good of the community."
Notwithstanding some language of the courts,28 such municipal
10 Sir Frederick Pollock, 13 LAW QUART. REV. 337-338 (1897).
= State v. White, 64 N. H. 48, 5 Atl. 828 (1886).
2 The Manhattan Mfg. etc. Co. v. Van Keuren, 23 N. J. Eq. 251 (1872).
2 Lochner v. New York, supra note 14.
1 See Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 Publications of the Amerlcam
Sociological Society, 16 (1920); Chandler, op cit., supra note 12.
B See e. g., Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 At. 354r (1920).
But see contra Fruth v. Board of Affairs, supra note 5 (W. Va. 1915); and see
In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946, 252 S. W. 404 (Mo. 1923) that such aesthetic
building lines can be established only under the power of eminent domain, upon
payment of just compensation. See Comment, 30 YALE L. J. 171.
See e. U., In re Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass 597, 127 N. E. 525 (1920)
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920)
City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Ia. 1096, 184 N. W. 823 (1921)
Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923) ; State v. City of New
Orleans, 97 So. 440 (La. 1923). Compare Atkinson v. Piper, 195 N. W. 544 (Wis.
1923), (limiting the height of buildings under the police power).
" Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 410 (1915).
The courts so holding commonly S(LY that such regulations promote the publiz
nealth, safety, etc., rather than, or in addition to, the aethestic. But see foot note 12:
suprca.
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beautification when reasonable has in effect been recently held
legally permissible, at least in certain classes of cases, in New
York and Massachusetts and some other states 9 where aesthetic
sensibilities of the majority of the community are rather acute
and public opinion probably preponderates in favor of such beau-
tification. It has been recently held not legally permissible in
Texas and some other states"0 where there is probably not a pre-
ponderant settled public opinion in favor of municipal aesthetics.
Will a court, e. g., the West Virginia court, when the question arises
again, uphold such aesthetic city planning and zoning? It depends
largely on whether the preponderant settled public opinion in that
jurisdiction is, at the time, in favor of such municipal beautification.
For, to repeat, the law is, or tends to be, an expression of community
ideals, an expression of the preponderant settled opinion, the mores
of the times, as understood by the judges of the time being.
-T. P. H.
THE FIRST YFa'S WORK OF THE AmIERICA LAv INSTITUTE.-
The American Law Institute, founded in Washington, D. C., on
February 23, 1923, held its second annual meeting on the same
date this year, at the same place. The notable progress which
the organization has made during the past year may justify a
review of its activities. The purpose of the Institute, as formulated
at the organization meeting in 1923, was the authoritative restate-
ment of the law. It was evident that a substantial financial back-
ing would be necessary in order to carry on the work, but Elihu
Root, the chairman of the first meeting had intimated that, if the
interests and support of the legal profession were demonstrated, the
necessary funds would be forthcoming.
On April 17, 1923 the secretary of the Carnegie Corporation ad-
vised the Institute that the Board of Trustees of that Corporation
had appropriated the sum af $1,075,000 for the general purpose of
the Institute, to be paid in annual installments of substantially
$100,000, and that after the completion of the last payment in
1933, the corporation assumed no further obligation for the sup-
port or maintenance of the Institute.
Its financial arrangements being thus secured for a considerable
period of years, the council of the Institute elected at the first meet-
ing Mr. William Draper Lewis of Philadelphia, Director of the In-
9 See cases cited in foot note 26 supra.
30 See e. g., Spaun v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513 (1921) : City
•(SuIuassIp "rC 8 'Sg6I "o3) 68P "Al "S 99Z ' JtJAj *a snoq' *is o
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